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Judging in Secular Times:
Max Weber and the Rise of
Proportionality
David Schneiderman*

I. INTRODUCTION
Canada may have escaped some of the legitimacy concerns that have
arisen around judicial review in the United States, for instance, those that
turn on the degree to which original intentions should guide interpretation.1 There remains, however, a lingering legitimacy concern for the
Canadian Supreme Court, common to many high courts in constitutional
democracies around the world, namely, how to justify a form of rule
where there is deep disagreement over the application of constitutional
fundamentals. The solution, suggested in the work of the sociologist Max
Weber, is to embrace a model of “formal” legal rationality focused on
means-ends analysis. Weber observed that accompanying the decline of
magic and gods — associated with modern “disenchantment” — was the
rise of bureaucratic rationality. Modern administration conducted along
these lines rendered law calculable and predictable, the necessary handmaiden of the spread of both democracy and capitalism.2 Tendencies
toward the bureaucratization of power via this “living machine” were
“inescapable”.3 Weber bemoaned, nonetheless, the absence of political
*
Professor of Law, University of Toronto (david.schneiderman@utoronto.ca). I am grateful to
Benjamin Berger and to an anonymous reviewer for comments. I am particularly indebted to Ben for
generously providing space for my unorthodox reflections on the rise of proportionality review.
1
Justice Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 345. But see Bradley W. Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors: The ‘Living Tree’ and Originalist
Constitutional Interpretation in Canada” (2009) 22 Can. J.L. and Jur. 331.
2
Max Weber, “Parliament and Government in Germany” [hereinafter “Weber, ‘Parliament
and Government’”] in Max Weber, ed., Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994) [hereinafter “Weber: Political Writings”] 130, at 147-48.
3
Id., at 158.
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leadership in Germany to counteract these tendencies.4 “The future belongs to bureaucratization”, he reluctantly declared.5 The nearly
worldwide embrace of proportionality review among apex courts around
the world focused on means-ends calculations, I argue, validates in some
measure Weber’s prediction.6
This paper situates the ascendance of proportionality analysis in constitutional law in the context of the difficulty of managing disagreement in
secular states.7 I develop this idea, in the next part, with reference to Charles
Taylor’s work on secularity and then, in the third part, by turning to Weber’s
work on the sociology of law. In the last part, I illustrate the argument with
reference to a handful of cases drawn from the Supreme Court of Canada
and elsewhere. My frame is intended to be more descriptive than normative,
though I hope, in the course of the argument, to raise some doubts about the
utility of having judges perform this sort of function. The rise of proportionality review, I argue, amounts to a concession on the part of the judiciary that
the methodology they deploy differs little from that used by bureaucrats
employed by other branches of government.8

II. NOT FITTING TOGETHER
Charles Taylor has comprehensively detailed the rise of what he calls
the “modern social imaginary”. By social imaginary, Taylor is referring
4

Id.; Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics” in Weber: Political Writings, id., 309.
Weber, “Parliament and Government”, supra, note 2, at 156.
6
On the global embrace of proportionality see, among others cited below, David M.
Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 162; Alec Stone
Sweet & Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum.
J. Transnat’l L. 72 [hereinafter “Stone Sweet & Mathews”].
7
References to the “secular” are drawn principally from Charles Taylor, Modern Social
Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) [hereinafter “Taylor, Modern Social
Imaginaries”] and Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007)
[hereinafter “Taylor, A Secular Age”]. See also the discussion of secularization in Charles Taylor,
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), c. 18
(“Fractured Horizons”). The term is a modern construct that, Benson maintains, conceals its own
“hidden faith”: Ian T. Benson, “Notes Toward a (Re)Definition of the Secular” (2000) 33 U.B.C.
L. Rev. 519, at 521, 546.
8
This formulation resembles Kennedy’s account of the judicial embrace of balancing by
American liberal legalists. See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication [fin de siècle]
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), at 322 [hereinafter “Kennedy, Critique”]; cf. Max
Rheinstein, “Introduction” [hereinafter “Rheinstein”] in Max Rheinstein, ed., Max Weber on Law in
Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954) xvii, at xlvi. See also Stone
Sweet & Matthews, supra, note 6, at 87. I have more to say about the relationship between balancing
and proportionality below, in text associated with notes 76-87.
5
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to the way in which we, in the occidental West, understand our “fitting
together” — what we understand our collective expectations to be and
some of the deeper normative premises that ground these expectations.9
God is no longer part of this normative matrix. In certain milieux, admits
the believer Taylor, it is “hard to sustain one’s faith”.10 That is because
the normative premises of the modern social imaginary rule out the
presence of gods.
In the contemporary world, we will have abandoned the idea of a
higher being or order that structures our polity. This is what Taylor calls
the “great disembedding”,11 resulting in the rejection of hierarchical order in favour of a levelling of possibilities, formulated in the private
domain and exhibited by what we today call “identity”, in which all possibilities are on the table. This is the “rejection of higher times”, observes
Taylor, in favour of secular times that are “purely profane”.12 This is a
“purely self-sufficient humanism” that accepts no final goals beyond
human flourishing, nor allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing”.13 The social imaginary, then, portrays society as horizontal rather
than vertical.14
As deep disagreement resides within Taylor’s modern imaginary,15
conceptions of justice compete for supremacy, and so the state resembles
what Lefort describes as the “empty space” of sovereignty, periodically

9
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 23; Taylor, A Secular Age, supra,
note 7, at 171. There are, we must assume, many social imaginaries, or variants of modern
secularism, even within the Occident. See Talal Assad, “French Secularism and the ‘Islamic Veil
Affair’” The Hedgehog Review (Spring & Summer 2006) 93, at 101 (“Varieties of remembered
religious history, of perceived political threat and opportunity, define the sensibilities underpinning
secular citizenship and national belonging in the modern state”).
10
Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, note 7, at 3.
11
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 50.
12
Id., at 90; Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, note 7, at 209.
13
Taylor, A Secular Age, id., at 18.
14
Id., at 209, 392; also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Horizontal Society (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999).
15
The current of deep disagreement occurring within Taylor’s modern social imaginary
resembles Rawls “reasonable pluralism”: John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), at 36 (that a “permanent feature of the public culture of democracy” is a
diversity of “reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines”). As
Dyzenhaus observes, Rawlsian political liberalism cannot escape the fact of irreducible conflict,
“because the values about which it claims consensus and which form the basis of its neutrality are
both controversial and partisan”. See David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt,
Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 233
[hereinafter “Dyzenhaus”].
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occupied by various contingent political projects.16 Conflict about justice,
then, is endemic to the modern democratic state. The state, nevertheless,
must be seen to be neutral as between the variety of life projects available
to individuals in the modern social imaginary.17 No “one person or group”
can exclusively be associated with the state.18 The ends to be pursued, in
other words, are multifarious and seem to be “increasing without end”.19 It
is our communal task to facilitate their realization or at least not get in the
way without good reasons. It might be, then, that justice in the modern era
is premised on nothing more than generating institutions and procedures
for the fair resolution of moral conflict.20
What are the normative premises that underlie the modern social
imaginary? In the place of the sacred, Taylor proffers human rights, democracy and equality as generating the normative glue that hold together
modern polities.21 Taylor oversimplifies by suggesting there is agreement
in the West over what these things mean in practice. Indeed, it is in the
course of specifying what equality or democracy means in practice that
disagreement stubbornly persists.22 So there is little in the way of guidance about how these norms are to be realized in contemporary western
society. Taylor only points to modern bills of rights as being “the clearest
expression of our modern idea of a moral order underlying the political,
which the political has to respect”.23 Taylor provides little more in the
way of tools for resolving disagreement over the meaning of such norms.
We are forced to look elsewhere for further guidance. I will argue that
high courts in Canada and elsewhere now look to proportionality analysis
to help resolve this crisis of conflict.

16
Claude Lefort, “Reversibility: Political Freedom and the Freedom of the Individual” in
Democracy and Political Theory, translated by David Macey (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1988) 165, at 168-69.
17
The secular state cannot, of course, be neutral, as it has as its overriding object the
cultivation of the citizen-subject. See Talal Assad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam,
Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
18
Charles Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism” [hereinafter
“Taylor, ‘Radical Redefinition of Secularism’”] in Eduardo Mendieta & Jonathan VanAntwerpen,
eds., The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 34,
at 47.
19
Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, note 7, at 437.
20
Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), at 52-53.
21
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 49.
22
David Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), at 11.
23
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 173; Taylor, A Secular Age, supra,
note 7, at 447.
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III. THE RISE OF BUREAUCRATIZED JUSTICE
Max Weber’s diagnosis of our “disenchanted” world provides the
backdrop for Taylor’s modern social imaginary. We now have access,
Weber declares, to “technical means and calculations” to solve modern
problems. There is no longer a need to have recourse to “magical means”
so as “to master or implore the spirits”.24 In this part, I turn to Weber’s
formulation of modern rationality and bureaucracy, outlined in his posthumously published treatise Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and
Society) (1978), in order to identify mechanisms for resolving disagreement
that many high courts favour.25 Weber anticipates by almost a century,
I suggest, the turn to proportionality on a nearly global scale.
Weber initially distinguishes between different ideal types of social
action, two of which mostly concern us here and which serve as place
holders for a discussion of formal and substantive rationality: “instrumentally rational” action and “value rational” action.26 Value rational
action consciously puts into practice convictions generated by ethical,
religious or some other value or “cause”.27 Instrumentally rational action,
by contrast, is determined by the “expectations” of human behaviour;
these expectations are the “means” used “for the attainment of the actor’s
own rationally pursued and calculated ends”.28 “Action is instrumentally
rational when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed”, declares Weber.29 The choice
between alternative ends might be determined in a value rational manner,
Weber admits, which will “always [be] irrational”.30 For this reason, Weber’s discussion of instrumental action is focused exclusively on choice
of means.31
Weber transposes these ideal types in his discussion of the economy,
where he contrasts “formal rationality” of economic action (in which

24
Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 129, at 139.
25
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. by
Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) [hereinafter “Weber,
Economy and Society”].
26
Id., at 24.
27
Id., at 25.
28
Id., at 24.
29
Id., at 26.
30
Id.
31
The rational actor can take as a given the choice of ends but may rank them in order of
priority according to the principle of “marginal utility” (id.).
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needs are satisfied based on impersonal technical calculation) with “substantive rationality” (in which the provision of basic needs is shaped by
the pursuit of some ultimate value).32 The formal and the substantive also
are foundational to his discussions of law and bureaucracy, where they
undergo further refining.33
In his discussion of categories of legal thought, Weber distinguishes
between: (1) rational and irrational lawmaking and lawfinding; and
(2) formal and substantive legality. This gives rise to a grid of four possibilities;34 formal irrational rule is rule not by intellect but by something
analogous to an oracle; substantively irrational rule is the concrete case
decided with reference to political, ethical or other non-legal norms, what
he derisively called “khadi justice”.35 All formal law is rational law, observes Weber.36 The degree of formality is determined by the degree to
which outcomes are guided by an identifiable system of rules laid down
in advance and generalizable.37 Substantively rational law, by contrast, is
distinguished on the basis that values exogenous to the formal legal system determine outcomes: it is influenced “by norms different from those
obtained through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of
meaning”.38 The key distinction, again, is that between the formally rational and the substantively rational. Without recourse to magic or to
spirits to resolve conflicting social ends, there is a high likelihood of disagreement about the results issuing out of substantive legal rational
reasoning. In our disenchanted world, it is formal legal rationality that
will increasingly define modern legal order, Weber maintains. It reaches
its “highest measure” in his ideal typical system of “logically formal”
rationality.39

32

Id., at 85.
Rheinstein, supra, note 8, at l.
34
Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), at 76 [hereinafter
“Kronman”]; David M. Trubek, “Max Weber and the Rise of Capitalism” (1972) Wis. L. Rev. 720,
at 729 [hereinafter “Trubek”].
35
Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 656, 976.
36
Id.
37
Kronman, supra, note 34, at 73.
38
Id., at 76; Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 657.
39
Weber describes logical formal rationality in this key passage:
Present-day legal science, at least in those forms which have achieved the highest measure of methodological and logical rationality, i.e. those which have been produced
through the legal science of the Pandectist’s Civil Law, proceeds from the following five
postulates: viz., first, that every concrete legal decision be the “application” of an abstract
legal proposition to a concrete “fact situation”; second, that it must be possible in every
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of legal
33
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Turning to Weber’s discussion of bureaucracy, it is here that formally
rational rule is most fully developed and provocatively elucidated.40 It is
provocative because Weber deliberately does not distinguish too carefully between various forms of bureaucratic rule.41 He subsumes under
“bureaucracy” the state’s “administrative staff [who] successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in
the enforcement of its order”.42 Weber does not talk very much about
judges — the “lawfinders”, he calls them, as opposed to the “lawgivers”
(legislators).43 Instead, he prefers to assimilate under his discussion of
bureaucratic rationality all forms of state administration, including the
administration of justice.44 Which is not to say that bureaucrats are precisely like judges,45 only that judges (civilian ones, in particular) bear
many of the hallmarks Weber associates with a professionalized bureaucracy. The predominant characteristics of modern bureaucratic rule
include: rule by professional administrators, with clear jurisdictional responsibilities, operating under a hierarchical order, managing written
documents (files) and following depersonalized general rules previously
laid down.46 The officeholder is appointed to serve a “vocation” for
which she is professionally trained (typically requiring some form of
higher education) and for which she receives a salary and security of tenure (often for life or with good behaviour).47
logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a “gapless” system of legal
propositions, or must, at least, be treated as it were such a gapless system; fourth, that
whatever cannot be “construed” rationally in legal terms is also legally irrelevant; and
fifth, that every social action of human beings must always be visualized as either an
“application” or “execution” of legal propositions, or as an “infringement” thereof, since
the “gaplessness” of the legal system must result in a gapless “legal ordering” of all social conduct” (id., at 657-58).
40
Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books,
1960), at 386.
41
See also Kennedy, Critique, supra, note 8, at 368-69; Duncan Kennedy, “The
Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality or Max Weber’s Sociology in the
Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought” (2004) 55 Hastings L.J. 1031, at
1040 [hereinafter “Kennedy, ‘Disenchantment’”].
42
Weber, Economy and Society”, supra, note 25, at 54 (emphasis in original).
43
Isher-Paul Sahni, “Vanished Mediators: On the Residual Status of Judges in Max
Weber’s ‘Sociology of Law’” (2006) 6 J. Classical Sociology 177, at 177.
44
Kennedy, “Disenchantment”, supra, note 41, at 1040.
45
Mattias Kumm, “Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and
Limits of the Proportionality Requirement” [hereinafter “Kumm”] in George Pavlakos, ed., Law,
Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 131,
at 140, n. 21.
46
Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 957-59.
47
Id., at 960ff.
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What does the “bureaucratization of justice” look like? A “system of
rationally debatable ‘reasons’ stands behind every act of bureaucratic
administration, namely”, Weber writes, “either subsumption under norms,
or a weighing of ends and means”.48 By norms, Weber appears to be
referring to conventional understandings about law and justice.49 Weber
treats dispute resolution via ends-means calculations, however, as a more
evolved and preferred mode of legal rationality. This is because the
determination of whether social action is rationally purposeful action is
best undertaken with reference to the choice of means that have been
adopted rather than having recourse to a ranking of ultimate ends. An
assessment of means generates “the highest degree of verifiable certainty”,
he writes, while a focus on ends “often cannot be understood completely”.50
In the former case, the relation of means and end will be clearly
understandable on grounds of experience, “particularly where the choice of
means was inevitable”.51 The bureaucratization of legality, insofar as it is
intended to promote purposeful rational action, will increasingly look to
assessments of means over ends.
Weber does not stipulate, however, that judicial functions are better
served under means-ends rationalizations. He does anticipate, however,
the predictable objections to his characterization of the “modern judge as
an automaton into which legal documents and fees are stuffed at the top
in order that it may spill forth the verdict at the bottom, along with
reasons, read mechanically from codified paragraphs”.52 Such a
conception would angrily be rejected, he admits, even though “a certain
approximation of this type would precisely be implied by a consistent
bureaucratization of justice”.53 Weber appears to confine these
disparaging remarks to German and continental judges. Weber
characterizes common law judging based on precedent, however, in not
much more favourable terms.54 Common law judging is an “empirical
art” associated with khadi justice, he writes, and therefore “less rational

48

Id., at 979 (emphasis added).
Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental
History, translated by Guenther Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), at 44
[hereinafter “Schluchter”].
50
Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 5.
51
Id., at 18.
52
Id., at 979.
53
Id. Weber derisively describes the churning of a judicial “slot machine into which one just
drops the facts (plus the fee) in order to have it spew out the decision (plus opinion)” (id., at 886).
54
Id., at c.viii.
49

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

JUDGING IN SECULAR TIMES

565

and less bureaucratic” because focused on the individual case.55 A more
sympathetic appreciation for the common law method is suggested
elsewhere, however.56 In an essay on “‘Roman’ and ‘Germanic’ Law”,
Weber appears to admire the common law judge’s penchant for not
“avoid[ing] (in certain cases) the ethical consideration of economic
events”.57 By contrast, the “German judge throws the executioner’s
sword far away and cries out for formal characteristics”.58 This will
ensure, he observes, that the “social importance of the administration of
civil law will remain relatively modest”.59 Expressions of admiration for
the system of English justice suggests, as Ewing argues, that the common
law was not “deviant” but sufficiently formal, rational and calculable to
facilitate the rise of capitalism, in the sociological sense.60 Nevertheless,
even common law judges, Weber warns, will not resist the spread of
bureaucratized justice. He foresees that “the traditional position of the
English judge is also likely to be transformed permanently and
profoundly” by these same forces.61
55
Id., at 890, 976; Schluchter, supra, note 49, at 90-91. “Quite definitely”, Weber writes,
“English law-finding is not, like that of the Continent, ‘application’ of ‘legal propositions’ logically
derived from statutory texts” (in Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 317).
56
See the important essay by Isher-Paul Sahni, “Max Weber’s Sociology of Law” (2009)
9 J. Classical Sociology 209, at 215, which argues that Weber “implicitly extols the English
administration of justice”.
57
Id., at 188; Max Weber, “‘Roman’ and ‘Germanic’ Law” (1985) 13 Int’l J. Sociology 237
[hereinafter “Weber, ‘“Roman” and “Germanic” Law’”], at 244. Weber appeared to admire English
parliamentary forms of government, enabling rule by an educated political elite, which he sought to
replicate, to some degree, in Germany. See Weber, “Parliament and Government”, supra, note 2;
Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920, translated by Michael S.
Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), at 88, 397 [hereinafter “Mommsen”]. On
Weber’s affinity for English parliamentism and the tension with the need for responsible political
leadership (which he labelled “caesarism” [1918]), see Sven Eliaeson, “Constitutional Caesarism:
Weber’s Politics in their German Context” in Stephen Turner, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 131.
58
Weber, “‘Roman’ and ‘Germanic’ Law”, supra, note 57, at 245.
59
Id.
60
Sally Ewing, “Formal Justice and the Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber’s Sociology of
Law” (1987) 21 Law & Soc’y Rev. 487, at 499 [hereinafter “Ewing”]. The problem of England is
discussed in Trubek, supra, note 34, at 746-48.
61
Id., at 894. This appears to contradict an observation Weber makes elsewhere, that there
is no “visible tendency towards a transformation of the English legal system in the direction of the
continental under the impetus of the capitalist economy”. He notes that where the two systems
“compete with one another, as in Canada, the Common Law has come out on top and has overcome
the continental alternative rather quickly” (in id., at 318). The contradiction can be resolved: Weber
anticipates convergence not by reason of capitalism’s inexorable force but due to an increase in the
“bureaucratization of formal legislation”. See Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 894.
Weber’s sociological reading of the Canadian experience — the only such reference I have found —
seems hard to reconcile with the fact of Canadian bijuralism.
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This seeming emptying of modern law of its moral content
precipitated indignant attacks from many commentators. Habermas, for
instance, accuses Weber of having smoothed the path for the rise of the
Third Reich and its principal legal apologist, Carl Schmitt, whom he
characterizes as Weber’s “legitimate pupil”.62 This is a bit far-fetched.63
Wolfgang Schluchter offers a more nuanced interpretation of the moral
content of Weber’s law. He maintains that Weber acknowledged
lawmaking and lawfinding as having contemporaneously both procedural
and substantive elements, either of which may predominate.64 Though
“separate things”, Weber acknowledged in his discussion of formal and
substantive rationality in the context of the economy, they “may coincide
empirically”.65 Ethical and moral content, in other words, is inevitably
internal to legal rationality.66 As law becomes increasingly generalized
and systematized, substantive rationality becomes subsumed under
formal rationality. “Legal development isolates, abstracts and hence
formalizes both the formal and substantive components of law”,
Schluchter observes.67 The dichotomy between form and substance is
therefore smoothed over in Weber’s internal account of law. The
dichotomy is pronounced, however, when the legal order is juxtaposed
with norms drawn from non-legal fields, that is, when Weber adopts an
external point of view.68
The best evidence of the substantive element in Weber’s account of
formal legal rationality is that law and administration has as its purpose
securing the needs of business for calculability and predictability.69
Modern forms of economic organization mandate increasingly formally
rational legal systems and so necessitate the spread of bureaucratic
organization. “[F]ormal and substantive rationality”, Weber admits,

62

Mommsen, supra, note 57, at 410.
Ewing, supra, note 60, at 504; Dyzenhaus, supra, note 15, at 236.
64
Schluchter, supra, note 49, at 88.
65
Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 108.
66
Weber famously acknowledged, for instance, the modern indebtedness to “achievements”
secured in “the age of the Rights of Man” (id., at 1403); also Weber, “Parliament and Government”,
supra, note 2, at 159. On the difficulty of sustaining a strict separation between the formal and the
substantive, and their methodological presuppositions, see Martin Albrow, “Legal Positivism and
Bourgeois Materialism: Max Weber’s View of the Sociology of Law” (1975) 2 Brit. J.L. & Soc. 14,
at 28 [hereinafter “Albrow”].
67
Schluchter, supra, note 49, at 91.
68
Id.
69
David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1985), at 274-76 [hereinafter “Beetham”].
63
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“coincide to a relatively high degree” in market matters.70 It is “primarily
the capitalist market economy which demands that the official business
of public administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously,
continuously, and with as much speed as possible”, Weber maintains.71
As in the market, bureaucracy necessitates the “discharge of business
according to calculable rules and ‘without regard to persons’”.72 It is not
the case, however, that the “propertyless masses” would reap many
benefits from formally rational “bourgeois” law.73 Indeed, legality alone
likely is insufficient to beget legitimacy. Weber predicts, for these
reasons, the inevitable pressures to “deformalize” law in order to
advance the goals of substantive justice. These pressures unavoidably
“collide with the formalism and the rule-bound and cool ‘matter-offactness’ of bureaucratic administration”.74 This seemingly deformalized
account of law — of a “pure and timeless rationality”75 — is
significantly tainted, then, by its substantive content, namely, an
ideological vindication of capitalism’s relentless pursuit of profit.76

IV. IS PROPORTIONALITY ANTIFORMALIST?
Proportionality review is preoccupied with measuring relationships
between means and ends for the purpose of determining whether rights
limitations are constitutionally permissible. An apex court typically will
first address the preliminary question of the “necessity” of the law: in
Canadian parlance, is the legislative objective sufficiently pressing and
substantial to limit constitutional rights and freedoms? So there is a
concern with ends, but courts rarely find objectives to be insufficiently
pressing.77 A series of sub-inquiries, focused on ends-means relations,
70

Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 109.
Id., at 974. Weber also maintains that modern mass democracy also engenders
bureaucratic tendencies (id., at 983).
72
Id., at 975 (emphasis in original).
73
Id., at 980.
74
Id.
75
Albrow, supra, note 66, at 15.
76
Beetham, supra, note 69, at 273. Marcuse goes so far as to equate Weber’s rationality
with profitability, whereby “Western Reason becomes economic reason — the drive for everrenewed profit in the continuous capitalist enterprise” (emphasis in original). See Herbert Marcuse,
“Industrialization and Capitalism” I/30 New Left Review (March/April 1965) 3, at 5, and discussion
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comprise the proportionality inquiry. First, are the means adopted
suitable for advancing the objective (“rational connection”); second, do
the means infringe on those rights as little as necessary (“least restrictive
means”); and, third, is the benefit gained by the legislative scheme
proportionate to the deleterious effect on rights (“proportionate effect”)?
Why, we might ask, is this not antiformalist — the sort of substantive
reasoning that is in tension with the “cool matter of factness” of formal
legal reasoning? Duncan Kennedy makes precisely this claim,
analogizing U.S.-style balancing to a mere technical “means of pacifying
conflicts of interest”.78 With no real coherence — it certainly is not a
closed and gapless system — a Weberian “disenchantment” has set in
giving rise to a new ideal type of “policy argument”, akin to a
“formalized substantive rationality”, maintains Kennedy.79 Policy
analysis is committed to “balancing conflicting policies, with an eye to
consequences, in a context in which rules represent no more than the
means to implement the resulting compromise”.80 Elsewhere, Kennedy
likens U.S.-style “balancing” to proportionality review in European
public law. They seem to be “identical”, he surmises, and suggests that
the origins of German proportionality review are traceable to the
influence of U.S. balancing that arose in response to the formalism of
classical legal thought.81
At the high level of abstraction that Kennedy describes this “single
evolving template”, there is an instructive overlap between the two approaches.82 From the perspective (or “subjective belief” 83) of the relevant
actors (judges, lawyers, even law students), however, there may be little
overlap. Proportionality, for these actors, does not exhibit features of
U.S.-style judicial policymaking as described by Kennedy: a “last resort”, when “logical methods have ‘run out’”, with no consensus as to
78
Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 894; Kennedy, “Disenchantment”,
supra, note 41; Duncan Kennedy, “A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law”
[hereinafter “Kennedy, ‘A Transnational Genealogy’”] in Roger Brownswood et al., eds., The
Foundations of European Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 185.
79
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80
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81
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decide questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators”
(Kennedy, Critique, supra, note 8, at 322). This is the helpful observation with which I began this
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when the judiciary should have recourse to its methods.84 Instead, it is
understood as a formalistic template, which applies in all constitutional
cases and which is “less free” — more “controlled” and “predictable” a
technique — than balancing. 85
Rather than having a U.S. genealogy, the origins of German proportionality doctrine are traceable back to Prussian administrative courts of
the late 19th century that developed the method in order to determine
whether exercises of state police powers were excessive.86 The methodology, Cohen-Ilaya and Porat explain, “remained essentially formalistic”:
what guided administrative law court rulings in this period was a “more
formal means-ends analysis” rather than a “more substantive (balancing)” exercise.87 Proportionality review, according to this historical
account, “was completely neutral and ‘entirely independent of any ideology’”.88 In the next part, I argue that modern approaches to
proportionality (both judicial and scholarly) are entirely consistent with
this formalistic, rationalizing tendency. Indeed, one explanation for the
rapid, worldwide embrace of proportionality by high courts is that it assists judges in maintaining a semblance of neutrality at a time when there
is much disagreement over the meaning of constitutional essentials.
This is not to say that proportionality’s proponents have succeeded in
emptying their preferred method of its substantive content. To the
contrary, there is much going on under the guise of proportionality
review that aims to pass for indifference as to ends and as to the
correlation between means and ends. In which case, it may be that
modern approaches look more like exercises in U.S.-style balancing.
This is apparent in Weber’s analysis of the relationship between law and
capitalism.89 Weber even admits that, “as far as facts are concerned”, the
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law is not a convincingly “gapless” system.90 With Kennedy, we should
no longer be under the illusion that the “system” is neutral and “in some
sense produces the norms that decide cases”.91 Instead, we should be
attentive to the ways in which judicial techniques, particularly those with
successful global take-up, both bracket certain inquiries and serve
particular interests. Elsewhere I have characterized the process,
following Bourdieu, as a site of struggle over the ability to name one’s
reality as common sense — a power to ordain that which is obvious or
self-evident.92 There remains the hope among its proponents,
nonetheless, that proportionality will have a “disciplining and
rationalizing effect” such as to render its results less arbitrary and more
predictable.93

V. PROPORTIONALITY’S FORMALITIES APPLIED
It is surprising that the contemporary literature on the rise of proportionality review, within Canada and globally, mostly has missed this
connection to Weber.94 Many of the critiques of means-ends rationality
review were anticipated in debates with Weber, for instance, that proportionality review elides the complexity of rights and the necessity for
moral evaluation in determining the content and scope of rights.95 Defenders of proportionality try to appease their critics by rejecting the
claim that proportionality is devoid of any moral reasoning (as does
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Schluchter).96 At the same time, defenders of proportionality applaud its
structure of reasoning as it generates “more rationality towards the whole
process” of weighing rights.97 Indeed, the literature is replete with claims
about improving the “rationality” of constitutional decisionmaking (and
this without reference to “rational connection” or “suitability” criteria
associated with proportionality review).
More striking is the prevalence of mathematical or mechanical imagery,98 which for Weber was the mark of modern rational thought.
According to Robert Alexy’s influential account, generalizing from the
work of the German Constitutional Court, the greater the intensity of the
infringement, the greater must be satisfaction of some countervailing
constitutional principle.99 This is reduced to a “law of balancing”100 and
the generation of a mathematical model Alexy calls the “weight formula”.101 Proportionality’s defenders, however, deny that constitutional
rights problems will always be answered by having recourse to the logic
of numbers. Instead, things such as Alexy’s “weight formula” help make
the process more “rational”. Admitting that proportionality aspires to
have the precision of mathematics, the “model [still] works fine without
any use of numbers”, admit Klatt and Meister.102
We can surmise that judges are aware of the benefits of having recourse to proportionality’s forms of argument. Indeed, it is remarkable
how widely the method has been embraced by apex courts in
constitutional democracies around the world,103 even popping up occasionally in the U.S. Supreme Court, the principal outlier in the field.104
96
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Proportionality review, judges must assume, looks more precise, objective and therefore legitimate than is the second-guessing of legislative
ends. Yet, in so doing, judges replicate roles performed by lawmakers
and their functionaries, tailoring laws without having to engage in too
many value judgments (which are otherwise suppressed).
The Canadian evidence in this regard is incontrovertible. We have
seen the Supreme Court of Canada pretty much abandon the first two
limbs of its inquiry (“pressing and substantial objective” and “rational
connection”) in order to speed ahead to the seemingly more scientific
“less restrictive means” inquiry.105 Monahan and Petter astutely describe
this as the “democracy-perfecting” stage of the Court’s analysis.106 No
second-guessing here, only an opportunity to sit in the shoes of the legislators and, if need be, discipline them into being better tailors. This helps
to explain the Courts’ indignant response to the government of Canada
when it shielded, under the cloak of cabinet confidentiality, evidence of
less restrictive alternatives in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General).107 The Court would not condone being denied the material
with which to perform its democracy-perfecting functions.108
Having recourse to a couple of other Supreme Court of Canada cases
helps to sustain the claim that the judicial role in proportionality review is
a form of bureaucratic reasoning anticipated by Weber. R. v. Edwards
Books and Art Ltd.109 provides an early example where the Court sought to
weigh competing interests pitted against each other, namely, those of
sabbatarians and retail sector workers. In the context of determining
whether it was less impairing of religious freedom to allow a full Sunday
exemption for sabbatarians, Dickson C.J.C. carefully calibrated the
interests of each and concluded that a full exemption (under the Court’s
least restrictive means analysis) would “entail a substantial disruption of
the quality of the pause day”.110 Instead, Dickson C.J.C. preferred to
maximize the benefit of a common pause day to Ontario workers by
deferring to the legislative solution of limiting retail space to 5,000 square
Porat, “The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: Proportionality Approach in American
Constitutional Law” (2009) 46 San Diego L. Rev. 367.
105
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feet and to no more than seven employees. Deferring to policy choices
already made, the Court conceded it could do no better than the legislature
in tailoring means to ends.
A rigid bureaucratic rationality underlay McLachlin C.J.C.’s majority
opinion in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta.111 Deferring to
Alberta’s stated policy objective for having photos taken for driver’s licences
— in order to produce a digital data bank of all drivers so as to reduce identity theft in the province (not for the purpose of improving road safety) —
McLachlin C.J.C. single-mindedly refused to deviate from the government’s
aim of having a one-to-one correspondence between drivers and photos.
Anything less, she complained, would lead to “some increase in risk
and impairment of the government goal”.112 Any alternative scheme would
“significantly compromise”113 and would not “substantially satisfy” that
goal.114 This astonishing level of deference to legislative objectives and its
optimization at any cost, though defensible under a version of proportionality analysis, underscores the Court’s concession of policy grounds to
lawmakers. The Court’s rigid adherence to the logic of its proportionality
analysis is significantly undermined by its abandonment at the proportionate
effects stage and by the embrace of a new standard of “meaningful
choice”.115 Looking much less like typical means-ends analysis in this fourth
and final stage, renders the ruling aberrant. The joint dissent of LeBel and
Fish JJ. (in addition to the dissent of Abella J.) appears to be more honest, by
contrast. The search under section 1, they write, is to “reach a better
balance” rather than considering alternatives based “on a standard of maximal consistency with the stated objective”.116 The dissenting justices seem
to admit that there is more going on than the majority admits — that the
logic of proportionality gives rise to contestable value judgments.
This approach to balancing, in which ends and means are carefully
calibrated so as to maximize rights, can be found in the work of high
courts in other jurisdictions: it is epitomized by President Aharon Barak
of the Supreme Court of Israel ruling in Beit Sourik.117 The case
111
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concerned a 40-kilometre stretch of the wall separating Israel from the West
Bank. Palestinian villagers sought to divert construction of the “fence” so as
not to be separated from their agricultural lands. The petitioners claimed
that fundamental rights, including those to property, freedom of
movement, occupation and religion, were infringed. Though authority to
erect the fence was sanctioned by the Court, President Barak concluded (in
the last branch of proportionality, “in the narrow sense”) that the fence’s
route could be adjusted. Though resulting in a minutely diminished
security advantage, adjustment would result in a correspondingly
significant increase in the satisfaction of the petitioners’ basic rights.118
Barak’s conclusion resonated in a discourse of quantifiable harms and
benefits:
The gap between the security provided by the military commander’s
approach and the security provided by the alternate route is minute, as
compared to the large difference between a fence that separates the
local inhabitants from their lands, and a fence which does not
separate the two (or which creates a separation which is smaller and
possible to live with).119

The mathematical merit of proportionality has not been lost on judges
in many high courts around the world. It also has not been lost on agents
promoting new transnational legal institutions that perform adjudicative
functions. In the field of international investment law, for instance, investment tribunals have been wading into controversial policy domains,
limiting state capacity in order to protect the interests of foreign investors.120 Scholars in the field have responded by advocating the adoption of
proportionality as a means of resolving the legitimacy problems that continue to plague the system. “Intense concerns about legitimacy in the
system”, it has been said, “should drive a rapid adoption of proportionality
analysis as a standard technique”.121 Anything less would be “suicidal”.122
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This is not to say, returning to the Canadian example, that the
Supreme Court of Canada is focused single-mindedly on ends-means
rationality review. There is much else going on, as LeBel and Fish JJ.
Intimate in Hutterian Brethren,123 including the valuing of certain
activities and the devaluing of others, for example, in the Court’s
freedom of expression cases124 — value judgments in these sorts of cases
being “inevitable”.125 There is, in other words, much moralizing going
on, although the Court typically does not wish to emphasize this aspect
of its work.126 It would prefer to be seen to be focusing on more objective
criteria that are susceptible to empirical evaluation — a function that
enlightened bureaucratic reason is well equipped to perform.

VI. CONCLUSION: NOBODY DOES IT BETTER?
The judicial embrace of proportionality analysis on a worldwide scale
raises the question of whether the judicial branch is best suited to perform
functions associated with bureaucratized justice. Recall that Weber
subsumes under the umbrella of bureaucratic reasoning the judicial
function: the bureaucratization of justice does not carefully distinguish
between judicial reasoning and that of other functionaries. The embrace of
judicial review focused almost exclusively on ends-means analysis, I have
argued, amounts to an admission on the part of the judicial branch that they
have given up serving functions other than bureaucratic ones.
Questions arise not only about suitability, but also about
institutional capacity. With a judicial focus squarely on appropriate
means, the question of proof perennially arises. However adequate the
evidentiary record, it typically points in different directions.127 With
what techniques should the judiciary resolve evidentiary disagreement?
Having to second-guess policy decisions “under conditions of factual
uncertainty”, courts encounter an “enormous institutional dilemma”
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concerning questions of deference.128 What comparative advantage does
the judicial branch bring to the performance of these functions? Might
some other, perhaps not yet envisaged, institution be better suited to do
this sort of work? Late 19th-century Prussian administrative law courts,
credited with having originated proportionality doctrine on the
Continent, for instance, were composed at various levels of a mix of
jurists, bureaucrats and laypersons.129
I cannot provide fulsome answers to these questions by way of a
conclusion. Instead, I propose we return to Weber’s suggestive account
of the rise of formal legal rationality. Weber associates its ascendance
with the expansion of professional legal training in university settings.
The fourth and final stage of legal development, Weber writes, follows
upon the “systematic elaboration of law and professionalized administration of justice by persons who have received their legal training in a
learned and formally logical matter”.130 It is legal education, in either its
continental or common law variants, which plays a key role in generating
“a dependable and professional group of administrators”.131 “[G]eneral
economic and social conditions” only indirectly influence the increasing
rationalization of law, Weber maintains. Instead, it is the “prevailing type
of legal education, i.e., the mode of training of the practitioners of the
law, [which] has been more important than any other factor”.132
Legal education may be performing similar functions today. Even
though the judicial arm may not be best suited to undertake the kind of
policy second-guessing expected under proportionality review, the
institutions of legal education are generating the conditions for more
expert, and more formally rational, application of its techniques. To the
128
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extent that law schools make proportionality review central to their
teaching (in constitutional, European, and international trade and
investment law, for instance), then we can assume that lawyers making
argument and justices deciding cases will be better equipped to do so.
Legal education focused on means-ends rationality review, in other
words, will aid in the better performance of techniques associated with
this judicial function. Which is not to say that another more specialized
branch may not do better. But given the allure of seemingly neutral
methods, the judicial branch is likely to jealously guard the continuing
performance of this function. In our disenchanted times, it is, after all,
one of the few remaining things they claim to do well.

